The menace at Nanoose is very real (Times Colonist)

As we approach the Nanoose Bay seabed expropriation hearings, the citizens
of this province should look more closely at who wins and who loses if the
federal government's plans go ahead.

Canada is a country at peace with the world, yet our federal government is
actively defending a serious military threat to the environment and health
of British Columbians.

Since 1965 the U.S. navy's underwater warfare research centre has
maintained what its website refers to as its ``fleet testing and logistics
site'' at Nanoose Bay. Although the official name is the Canadian Forces
Maritime and Experimental Test Ranges, the primary function of this site is
to provide a torpedo test range for nuclear-powered, nuclear
weapons-capable U.S. submarines. The soft seabed allows them to retrieve
their expensive torpedoes undamaged.

According to data obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, from 1990
to 1996 U.S. nuclear submarines visited the facility 33 times, firing more
than 4,600 torpedoes. On three occasions Nanoose welcomed a giant U.S.
ballistic missile submarine, capable of launching up to 192 nuclear
warheads to targets almost anywhere in the world.

The fact is some very serious dangers are posed to the citizens of B.C. by
the continued operation of this U.S. nuclear submarine test range. First,
these submarines may carry nuclear weapons into B.C. waters. If they do,
the Canadian public will not be informed, as it has long been U.S. navy
policy to ``neither conform nor deny'' the presence of nuclear weapons on
their ships.

Second, all current U.S. navy submarines are nuclear powered. Unlike
civilian nuclear reactors, they use bomb-grade uranium as fuel. At least
eight times since the first U.S. nuclear submarine was built, there have
been serious accidents, and the U.S. navy still refuses to divulge complete
information on radiation released into the environment. Even routine
operations with these reactors are inherently risky. In the words of one
former U.S. submariner, ``a reactor scram [emergency shutdown] is always an
exciting drill, because once you start it, it's no longer an exercise.''

A University of California study has concluded that a fire involving
nuclear weapons or a reactor accident could cause thousands of fatalities.
As at Chernobyl, a serious accident could release a witch's brew of
radioactivity.

Even Canada's Department of National Defence acknowledges that in the event
of an accident some residents in the area would suffer acute radiation
sickness, and of course cancer rates would soar even for those less heavily
exposed.

The same DND report acknowledged that emergency response preparations at
Nanoose were ``marginal or unsatisfactory'' in some areas, and last year
Canada's Auditor General noted that most of his concerns expressed in his
1992 report on nuclear emergency preparedness had not been addressed.
(While a Canadian navy spokesperson has stated the likelihood of a serious
nuclear accident is ``tiny'', it might be worth noting that five of the
eight technicians on duty at the time of the Three Mile Island accident
were U.S. navy trained.)

Finally, nuclear submarine traffic up and down the B.C. coast poses a
considerable threat to navigation. Submarines frequently collide with or
snag surface vessels. Submarines have difficulty detecting small surface
ships. Subs ride low in the water when surfaced and are coated with
materials that do not reflect radar. Submerged, they are virtually
undetectable, and are nearly ``blind'' in confined waters because they rely
on passive sonar.

During the making of The Hunt for Red October, a U.S. submarine
accidentally snagged a towboat, sinking it with loss of life. Closer to
home, in 1994 a German-built Chilean submarine on its way back from testing
torpedoes at Nanoose collided with and sank the B.C. sailboat Moonglow,
nearly drowning its owner, Jory Lord. This collision happened even though
the Moonglow was using full running lights, radar and a foghorn, and the
modern, high-tech submarine was deploying radar reflectors and had an
American officer aboard. Given the rapidly growing pleasure boat traffic in
Georgia Strait, such accidents may occur with even greater frequency in the
future.

The Americans are very eager to continue operating the Nanoose test range,
as they gain considerable benefit from it. But it is reasonable to ask what
Canadian interests are served by the continued operation of the Nanoose base.
 
 

Michael Wallace is professor of political science at the University of
British Columbia, who has been working on nuclear issues for more than 30
years.
 

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